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  • Name: JOINT TASK FORCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY IN NIGERIA: AN EVALUATION OF OPERATION RESTORE ORDER I
  • Type: PDF and MS Word (DOC)
  • Size: [321 KB]
  • Length: [67] Pages

 

ABSTRACT

The spate of violent extremism and domestic terrorism in Nigeria since 2009 especially in Yobe and Borno States, had led to loss of thousands of lives and property warranting the deployment of Joint Task Force Operation RESTORE ORDER I (JTF ORO1). Concerns have been raised regarding the effectiveness of JTF ORO I in the containment of the situation in North Eastern Nigeria. The main objective of the study was to assess the effectiveness of JTF in Internal Security (IS) in Nigeria. It was on this premise that I undertook the study titled “Joint Task Force and Internal Security in Nigeria: An Evaluation of Operation RESTORE ORDER I”.

 

The study was essentially an exploratory research which integrate both quantitative and qualitative data. Data were collected from primary and secondary sources using both the field methods and document analysis. Primary data were collected through the use of questionnaires and unstructured interviews with various stakeholders. The secondary data were collected from books, official publications, unpublished materials, libraries among others. These data were verified and analysed empirically to arrive at deductions for necessary recommendations.

 

The study revealed that the employment of JTF in IS is operationally expedient in view of the nature of contemporary security challenges which is beyond the scope of the capability of a single service.  Some of the identified challenges were lack of policy guidelines on asymmetric warfare, inadequate joint training, inadequate human and technical capability for intelligence gathering, deficient logistic support system, poor and antagonistic media operations. The prospects identified include full utilisation of the Nigeria Army Counter Terrorism/Counter Insurgency Centre (NA CT/COIN) for training of special forces for counter terrorism/counter insurgency and the establishment of the counter terrorism department in the office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) among others.

 

Strategies to mitigate the challenges identified include formulation of National Security Policy, utilisation of the NA CT/COIN, procurement of modern technical and electronic equipment for intelligence gathering, establishment of joint logistic base and effective information operations. The study therefore recommended among others that the FGN should formulate national security policy, upgrade the NA CT/COIN to national special operations training establishment, acquire integrated technology driven intelligent gathering platforms to be coordinated by ONSA. Additionally, the DHQ should improve media-military relations and establish a joint logistic base to harmonise logistics. Further studies of these nature could focus on what roles stakeholders other than security forces should play in counter terrorism and counter insurgency.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Content                                                                                   Page

Title Page……………………………………………………………………………………..                 i

Certification…………………………………………………………………………………..                ii

Dedication……………………………………………………………………………………..               iii

Acknowledgement…………………………………………………………………….                      iv

Abstract………………………………………………………………………………….                       v

Table of Contents……………………………………………………………..             vi

Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………….                    ix

List of Tables and Figures…………………………………………………………….                    x

List of Appendices……………………………………………………………………….                    xi

Abbreviation and Acronyms………………………………….……………….               xiii

Definition of Terms………………………………………………………………………                    xv

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1       Background to the Study………………………………………………………….         1

1.2       Statement of the Research Problem……………………………………………..          4

1.3       Objectives of the Study………………………………………………………………..       5

1.4       Significance of the Study…………………………………………………………….        5

1.5       Scope of the Study………………………………………………………………………       6

1.6       Methodology of the Study……………………………………………………………        6

1.7       Limitations of the Study……………………………………………………………….       8

 

 

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1       Conceptual Discourse………………………………………………………………….        11

2.2       Relationship between Joint Task Force and Internal Security

Operations………………………………………………………………………                      14

2.3       Review of Some Existing Literature…………………………………………….        16

2.4       Theoretical Framework……………………………………………………………..           17

2.5       Examples of the Employment of Joint Task Force in Internal

Security from other Countries…………………………………………….                    18

 

 

 

CHAPTER THREE

EVALUATION OF JOINT TASK FORCE OPERATION RESTORE ORDER 1 IN INTERNAL SECURITY IN NIGERIA

 

3.1       Overview of Joint Task Force Involvement in Internal Security

in Nigeria………………………………………………………………………………              23

 

3.2       Issues involved in the Employment of Joint Task Force Operation

RESTORE ORDER 1 in Internal Security in Nigeria……………………….        26

 

3.3       Contributions of Joint Task Force Operation RESTORE ORDER 1 in

Internal Security in Nigeria……………………………………………………………..     34

 

3.4       Summary of Research Findings……………………………………………………….      37

 

3.5       Challenges Militating against Joint Task Force Operation RESTORE

ORDER I’s Efforts at enhancing Internal Security in Nigeria…………….       38

 

3.6       Prospects for Enhancing Internal Security in Nigeria Using Joint

Task Force……………………………………………………………………………………      41

 

 

 

CHAPTER FOUR

STRATEGIES TO MITIGATE THE CHALLENGES OF JOINT TASK FORCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY IN NIGERIA

 

4.1       Strategies to Mitigate the Challenges of Joint Task Force and

Internal Security in Nigeria……………………………………………………………       49

 

4.2       Implementation Plan for the Strategies Proffered……………………………..       52

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1       Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………        54

5.2       Recommendations………………………………………………………………………        56

 

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books………………………………………………………………………………………..                    57

Periodicals/Journals…………………….……………………………………….               58

Official Publications…………………………………………………………………..                      58

Newspapers…………………….………………………………………………………….                    59

Internet and Electronic Media…………………….……………………………..               60

Unpublished Materials…………………………………………………………………                     61

Unstructured Interviews……………………………………………………………….                    62

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

 

1.1       BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

The history of the evolution of human societies is replete with various conflicts, crises and wars that threatened the survival of human beings and various measures adopted to resolve them. Being an integral characteristic of human nature, violence has often been used to seek redress to perceived grievances or in the pursuit of some personal or group interest and security. Human beings have inbuilt redress mechanisms that are most often used with prejudice and hatred, resulting in the destruction of lives and property. Security concern is largely believed to be the major factor that forced human beings to abandon the individualistic primitive state of nature to form organized societies.

The security of societies in the contemporary world is phenomenal and complex. This is because the world is becoming increasingly interdependent and interconnected as information and communication technology (ICT) have rendered nations borderless making movements between cities much easier.1 This increasing interdependency and interconnectivity coupled with the end of the Cold War, have precipitated new security challenges within the international arena.

In this emerging world order, new and asymmetric threats such as violent extremism, domestic terrorism and intra state conflicts have threatened to redefine the international system.2 These new forms of threats are characterised by ethnic, religious and land related communal conflicts which have constituted threats of worrisome dimensions to most nation’s internal security (IS).3 In the quest to counter these threats, nations have over the years made effort to put in place appropriate security policies and outfits to enhance their national security.

There is always a compelling obligation on the state to use constitutional provisions to maintain law and order. In order to achieve this, most nations depend on the Police that have the primary responsibility for the maintenance of law and order depending on the complexity, diversity and the range of actors involved in such conflict. In instances where the scale of the violence overwhelms the capacity of the police to contain, as has been witnessed in different parts of the world, the military is usually called upon to restore normalcy and bring the situation under control.  Such military role is what is referred to as internal security.  In such circumstances and depending on the nature and peculiar requirements of the situation, the military in conjunction with other national security apparatuses form a Joint Task Force (JTF) to manage the crisis. This was the justification for the British military’s involvement in Northern Ireland in 1969.4 The JTF de-escalated the conflict.

Joint Task Force has become increasingly integrated into national internal security conflict resolution mechanism. In the JTF arrangement to confront an emerging crisis, each Service brings to the joint force, different skills, competencies and amalgamation of assets resulting in a synergy that is beyond the sum of the individual service capability.5 The concept of JTF operation came into being during World War II (WW II) when the Allied and the Axis forces employed the land, sea and air forces in executing many operations.6 Since then, the JTF concept has been adopted globally. The whole range of procedures leading to the establishment of JTF for IS is based on the nation’s domestic law that authorises the deployment of the armed forces. However, domestic laws are influenced by the norms and standards of international law.

In the United States of America (USA), Chapter l8 of Title 10 Section 332 of the United States Code entitled “Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies”.7 It is this law that legally allows the military to intervene in domestic disturbances to enforce Federal authority. Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any state or territory by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call in the Federal service such as the militia of any state, and use armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion. This was the situation during the Los Angeles riot of 1992. A JTF comprising 10,000 troops from the California National Guard (CANG), 2,000 active component soldiers and 1,500 Marines were deployed by the USA Government in a single JTF operation to quell the Rodney King saga riot.8 This arrangement helped to contain the spread of the violence. Thus the JTF was effective in resolving the internal threat to security in the State of California.

In Indonesia, the 1945 Constitution established the Indonesian National Armed Forces, Tentara National Indonesia (TNI) and gave it, as part of its responsibilities, the legal authority to suppress insurrection whenever called upon to do so by the President. Consequently, this enabled the Indonesian Government, between 1998 and 2002 to deploy the Army Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD) and the Mobile Brigade (BRIMOB) in a JTF to contain the violent ethno-religious conflict in the Maluku Archipelago.9 The JTF deployment de-escalated the conflict by containing and preventing the spread of the crisis thereby saving between 750,000 to 1.3 million people that would have been internally displaced as a result of the conflict.10 The JTF proved a good conflict management tool in this circumstance.

                In Ghana, the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, Chapter 17 established the Armed Forces of Ghana (AFG).  The statute establishing the AFG allows the military to intervene in domestic disturbances to maintain Ghana’s Internal Security.11 This was the basis that the Ghanian Central Government used to deploy a JTF to quell the conflict between the Konkombas and the Nanumbas in Northern Ghana in 1994 in what is today termed the Guinea Fowl War.  During the conflict, there were about 2,000 deaths in 1994 alone, 322 villages were devastated and   some 178,000 people were displaced.12 However, the intervention of the JTF effectively contained the situation and succeeded in stopping the protracted conflict between the 2 tribes.

In Nigeria, the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) has a constitutional responsibility to provide Military Aid to Civil Power (MACP) and Military Aid to Civil Authorities (MACA) in time of crisis. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in Section 217 Subsections 1 and 2, captures this need by establishing the AFN. In Subsection 2(c) the Constitution specifically bestows on the AFN the responsibility of suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities personified by the Nigeria Police to restore law and order when called upon to do so by the President, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.13 In line with this and as a result of the various security challenges Nigeria is facing, the government has had to establish various JTFs to help restore law and order. Some of the JTF operations established are Operation SAFE CONDUCT which was to ensure safe conduct of the 2011 General Elections and prevent election related violence and Operation PULO SHIELD, established to protect the oil facilities against illegal bunkering, piracy and illegal arms importation across the Niger Delta. Furthermore, the Special Task Force Operation SAFE HAVEN was established to maintain law and order in Plateau State in aid of civil authority. These various JTFs have largely succeeded in their missions and tasks within limiting political and logistics constraints.

The spate of grave security breaches and incessant bomb explosions carried out by the Boko Haram Terrorists (BHTs) in some parts of Northern Nigeria threatened the security and internal stability of the nation. Consequently, a JTF comprising the military and other security forces was formed and nicknamed Operation RESTORE ORDER I (JTF ORO1). The JTF ORO1 was mandated to contain the intransigent behaviour of the BHTs in the North Eastern Nigeria. The employment of The JTF OROI by the FGN significantly reduced tension, rekindled hope and minimised human sufferings in Borno State between its induction in June 2011 and August 2013 when it was de-inducted.

However, despite these modest achievements, the effects of the use of JTF in mitigating IS problems in the country is not fully realised by the general populace. This is occasioned by previous military operations like the Zaki Biam and Odi massacres which were considered an abuse of the right to life and a display of impunity by the military. Additionally, the general public is curious and seemingly critical of the JTF, arguing in some cases that despite the resources and manpower committed in JTF OROI, there seem to be no corresponding significant achievement as the activities of the BHTs have continued unabated.

The purpose of this study is therefore, to evaluate JTF ORO1 in IS in Nigeria. Accordingly, the researcher’s motivation is to contribute towards finding effective ways of utilising JTF in mitigating IS problems in Nigeria.

 

1.2       STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Nigeria has witnessed an upsurge in internal security threats since 1999 and terror related attacks have acquired an alarming dimension in recent times. The internal crises have led to IS leading to the establishment of various JTFs. One of such JTFs is the JTF ORO1 constituted in 2011 to combat the BHTs’ activities in Borno State and indeed most states in North Eastern Nigeria. Following increasing BHTs’ violent attacks on mostly civilian population, President Goodluck Jonathan on 14 May 2013, declared a state of emergency in the states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe in order to checkmate the activities of the insurgents.

The JTF ORO1, in carrying out the IS tasks in Borno State had some operational challenges. The challenges appeared to relate largely to a lack of integrated intelligence gathering capability, inadequate training and experience of personnel in counter terrorism operations. Also, logistic support to the JTF and its ability to conduct media operations were considered less than adequate. Though several efforts were made to solve these problems, their effects were apparent. It is against this background that this study seeks answers to the following questions:

  1. What is the relationship between JTF and IS in Nigeria?
  2. What are the issues of JTF ORO1 to IS in Nigeria?
  3. What are the contributions of JTF ORO1in IS in Nigeria?
  4. What are the challenges of JTF ORO1 in IS in Nigeria?
  5. What are the prospects of JTF ORO1 to IS in Nigeria?
  6. What are the strategies to mitigate the challenges against the JTF OROI in IS in Nigeria.

 

1.3       OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

            The main objective of this study is to asses JTF in IS in order to establish its effectiveness in the resolution of IS problems in Nigeria. The specific objectives of the study are as follows:

  1. To establish the relationship between JTF and IS in Nigeria.
  2. Examine the issues involved in JTF ORO1 and IS in Nigeria.
  3. Evaluate the contributions of JTF ORO1 in IS in Nigeria.
  4. Identify the challenges that militated against JTF ORO1 in IS in Nigeria.
  5. Proffer strategies to mitigate the challenges against the effectiveness of the JTF OROI towards enhancing IS in Nigeria.

 

1.4       SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The significance of the study is in the utility of its outcome and recommendations by policy makers at the Presidency, National Assembly (NASS) National Security Council (NSC), MOD, DHQ and the Services to assist in policy formulation and decision making to curb the menace of domestic terrorism. It will also be valuable to the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) particularly the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) in coordinating the efforts of security forces in the fight against domestic terrorism.

Additionally, The DSS, NPF and the National Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) will also benefit from the study in their complementary roles in the fight against domestic terrorism.  Scholars and researchers in the field of counter terrorism will find the study useful as it will contribute to the existing body of knowledge on the contributions of JTF in IS particularly domestic counter terrorism/counter insurgency.

 

 

 

1.5       SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The study was delineated by time, space and content boundaries. In terms of time, the study covers the period between 2003 and August 2013. This period was chosen because it is within which Nigeria witnessed a new twist in the scale, frequency, pattern, sophistication and dimension of terrorism. It was also the time JTF OROI was inducted and de-inducted in Borno State for 7 Division Nigerian Army to take over the operation. However, reference to some earlier dates was made for the purpose of comprehension and data analysis.

In terms of space, the research focussed on JTF ORO1 in Maiduguri. This location was chosen because the main activity of JTF ORO1 was in Maiduguri and environs while other NA organised Operations RESTORE ORDER 11 and 111 not JTF were being conducted in the same region during the same period. In terms of content, the study was limited to the evaluation of JTF ORO1 within the context of IS in Nigeria.

 

1.6       METHODOLOGY

The work adopted a combination of content analysis and field survey method. This involved the gathering of official documents and publications as well as unstructured interviews. The assessment of JTF ORO 1 was based purely on interviews of past commanders of the operation and relevant security stakeholders. However, the methodology for this study covered 6 distinct areas which include type of research, sources of data and method of data collection. Others are sampling techniques, method of data analysis and method of data presentation. These are discussed subsequently.

1.6.1    Type of Research: The research was essentially a descriptive research as it builds on exploratory works done by other researchers. This work entails the following:

  1. Nature of Research: Most of the data collected were derived from interviews of a sample of the respondents. Furthermore, objective analysis of official documents and other publications were made to arrive at cogent deductions.
  2. Research Design: The field study method was adopted. This involved oral interviews of a sample of the past commanders, component and sector commanders of JTF ORO1 and other security stakeholders. On some occasions, telephone interviews were also conducted.

1.6.2    Sources of Data: The Data for this study were obtained from primary and secondary sources. These are amplified as follows:

  1. Primary Data: Primary data were obtained through unstructured and structured interviews with experts on terrorism, Desk Officers responsible for operations in the DHQ, Services HQ, past JTF ORO1 commanders. Those interviewed include Chiefs of Training and Operation DHQ and AHQ, Director of Defence Information, Director of Army Public Relations and past spokespersons of JTF ORO1. Others include Directors of Training and Operations DHQ, NHQ, and HQ NAF. Additionally, some arrested members of BHTs were interviewed. Details of some of the individuals interviewed are at Appendix 1.
  2. Secondary Data: Data from secondary sources were obtained from relevant books, journals, magazines, Internet, newspapers, official publications and other unpublished materials. Furthermore, official documents of the activities of JTF OROI were obtained form DHQ and AHQ Department of training and Operations. Additionally, data were sourced from the library facilities at National Defence College (NDC), University of Abuja, National Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), Kuru, Jos and Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution Library, Abuja.

1.6.3    Methods of Data Collection: Primary data were collected using unstructured and structured interviews, discussions and consultations with relevant stakeholders in the defence industry and related fields. Official documents and other publications were also examined to derive secondary data.

1.6.4    Sampling Technique: The population considered comprised security personnel that took part in JTF ORO1 and the sample size       was 100 respondents. The purposive sampling technique was used to select the sample of the population from which data were collected for the study. This involves unstructured interviews on the subject with selected AFN personnel and other stakeholders. It was assumed that only those who have commanded or taken part in JTF operations would be knowledgeable as to understand and provide relevant data for the study. The samples of the questions used for unstructured interviews are at Appendix 2.

1.6.5    Method of Data Analysis: Qualitative method of data analysis was employed. The data from the unstructured interviews and secondary sources were analysed qualitatively. The analysis was followed by logical reasoning to arrive at deductions which were the basis for the recommendations towards improving IS in the fight against domestic terrorism using JTF in Nigeria.

1.6.6    Method of Data Presentation: The data generated in this study were presented in descriptive and analytical forms with the aid of tables, diagrams, pie and bar charts where appropriate. Others were reduced to appendices for clarity.

 

 

 

1.7       LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The limitation encountered in the course of this study was lack of sufficient literature on the subject and poor record keeping at DHQ and Services Headquarters. Also, restricted access to classified documents presented a major challenge due to the sensitive nature of the subject. Efforts were made to overcome this limitation through discussions, consultations and interviews of those involved in planning and direction of AFN operations to fill the gap.

In particular, all the past senior commanders of JTF ORO1 were interviewed.  Furthermore, the data obtained from primary and secondary sources were analysed to fill the gap in the absence of official records.  The quality and validity of the study was thus unaffected. The next chapter discussed the literature review.


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